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Abstract
      The firewall is normally an intermediate system
between the secure internal networks and the less secure
external networks.  It is intended to keep corporate
systems safe from intruders, hackers, and accidental entry
into the corporate system. The primary types of firewalls
are screening routers, proxy servers, and stateful
inspectors.   Before choosing a firewall architecture, a
company must have the right mind set regarding threat. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an introduction to
firewall concepts and help develop this mind set. 
Introduction
Internet connection sharpens the competitive edge of
most businesses today since it gives them and their
customers timely access to information. The use of the
Internet spawns a new set of responsibilities and burdens
for IS departments. Internet and general purpose
computing  were not designed to provide any great degree
of security.  The recent denial-of-service attacks on
Amazon.com, eBay, Yahoo, and other Web sites show the
vulnerabilities of IT architectures.  IS must deliver reliable
Internet services to corporate users while ensuring that
systems and information stay secure from outside threats.
An enterprise using  Intranet must install firewalls to
prevent outsiders from accessing its own private data
resources and for controlling what outside resources its
own users must have access.  A recent survey of key
Internet hosts found that essentially 31 percent were wide
open to potential attackers and 33 percent had a high risk
of potential problems. 
The increased accessibility to information has not
come without a price. Any time information is distributed
on any type of network, there is the potential that such
information will be accessed by unauthorized persons.
Allowing access to authorized individuals may
inadvertently allow the intelligent intruder to gain access
for snooping or malicious purposes. Whether it is a
computer "hacker" intentionally trying to gain access or
an unintentional intrusion, the potential for lost or altered
information is enormous. So how do companies protect
themselves and their information?  Many companies are
turning to firewalls as a means of attaining these goals.
What is a firewall?
A firewall provides an important tool for protecting a
corporate network from Internet intrusions. A network
firewall is a hardware/software barrier between a
corporate network and Internet. A firewall is also an
intelligent device that controls traffic between two or
more networks for security purposes. Basically, a firewall,
working closely with a router program, filters all network
packets to determine whether to forward them to their
destination. A firewall is a set of related programs, located
at a network gateway server, that protects the resources of
a private network from users from other networks.
A fire wall usually consists of a UNIX or Windows
NT computer running special firewall software.  Other
hardware platforms such as routers can also run firewall
software. Although this software is usually associated with
Internet connections, it can be used  to control traffic
between parts of an intranet or between networks of
different corporations. A firewall is often installed in a
specially designated computer separate from the rest of
the network so that no incoming request can get directly at
private network resources.
Typically, firewalls employ one of three architectures
known as screen routers, proxy servers, and stateful
inspectors. By combining the strengths of more than one
approach, the firewall can be more effective.  Many
commercial firewalls employ more than one technique to
provide data protection.
Screening Routers.
One of the less complex architectures is screening.
This method screens requests to make sure they come
from acceptable (previously identified) domain names and
IP addresses.  A screening router applies a set of rules to
each incoming information packet and decides whether it
should be forwarded (or not) to the internal system.  The
screening router filters packets based on information that
is available in packet headers; such as protocol numbers,
source and destination addresses and port numbers, and
connection flags.  Through this process, the router
"screens" the information, allowing only approved
information to pass through.  The router serves an
additional function of "routing" the information to the
appropriate network or user.
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The primary advantage of using screening routers is
the low hardware costs and relative simplicity.  The
screening process is straight forward and the computing
requirements are not excessive.  Screen routers do have
some important disadvantages.  For example, it is difficult
to set up the packet filter rules correctly.  The possible
combinations of sending addresses, receiving addresses,
protocols, and flags make it difficult to establish rules
which apply correctly in every situation and it is
expensive to manage screening routers.  Requirements
continually change with more and more addresses
required to be added to the "allowable" address lists.  The
screening router method also lacks user-level
authentication protection.  For that reason, a packet may
be a "spoof" meant to look like an authorized and legal
packet while in fact it has just breached the "firewall.@
Proxy Servers
A firewall also includes or works with a proxy server
that makes network requests on behalf of workstation
users.  The user validation may only require user
identification and a password or it may be more robust
depending on the security desired.  An example of
robustness is the use of one-time passwords and a
challenge-and-response system.
The advantages of proxy servers overcome some of
the disadvantages of the screening routers.  For instance,
the proxy server employs user-level authentication
procedures which can  provide some protection from
spoofing which could fool the screening router.  The
proxy server also provides logging and accounting
information.  This is very useful in detecting intrusions
and intrusion attempts.  It can also be used to document
system use and communications workloads.
The major disadvantage of the proxy server results
from the requirement to build an application-layer
gateway for each application.  This requirement may
severely limit the deployment of new applications or at
least delay them excessively.  For full benefit of the proxy
server, there is no alternative other than building each
gateway. The Internet protocol uses packets as described
in the previous section to allow access directly with the
intended destination.  A proxy server interrupts this direct
connection by introducing a gateway between the open
network and the local network.  To pass through this
gateway, the outside location must address the "proxy"
directly and ask for access to the intended recipient.
Upon contact, the proxy asks the user for the name of
the remote host to be accessed.  The user will respond
with the host name, valid user identification and
authentication information.  Only then will the proxy
server contact the host and relay packets between the two
communication points.  The user validation may only
require user identification and a password or it may be
more robust depending on the security desired.
Stateful inspectors
But can a company feel safe if the packet is addressed
correctly and the user authenticates appropriately? 
Apparently not since several firewall products now
incorporate an inspection module called a stateful
inspector.  This module is software that inspects packets
to verify the application, user, and transportation method.
 By looking inside the packet, the inspector can also
investigate the possibility of harmful viruses hiding in
audio or video packets.  A special case of the stateful
inspector involves Java and X-Control protection which
will be discussed later. The major advantage of the
stateful inspector is the ability to detect some intrusion
attempts which would otherwise pass through a firewall.  
By looking into the packet rather than just at the header
information, additional protection is afforded.
The primary disadvantage is the high maintenance
activity involved with stateful inspectors. The stateful
inspector also adds some delay to the transfer of data.  If
the purpose is to find potentially damaging information,
the application must be continually updated to recognize
new viruses or intrusive applets.
Encryption and firewalls
Encryption is generally not considered a part of the
firewall architecture on the other hand encryption
provides many of the safeguards associated with firewalls.
Encryption can provide firewall protection in several
ways.  First, by encrypting passwords and authentication
procedures, eavesdroppers are not able to copy passwords
for later use in spoofing the system.  Second, without the
correct key, any encrypted data sent by an intruder would
translate into unintelligible random characters and
therefore have no meaning to the receiving system.  Such
corrupted data would not pass data checks on the host
computer and could not be used to insert rogue viruses or
programs into the host system.  Third, any intruder
reading corporation data being transmitted on an open
network would not be able to gather any intelligence.
  One use of encryption, called tunneling, is similar to
the use of the proxy server firewall.  At the transmitting
end, the entire packet is encrypted using a company
specific key.  Prior to sending the packet, an unencrypted
header is added which addresses the proxy server at the
destination.  Upon receiving the packet, the proxy server
strips off the unencrypted header and deciphers the
packet.  If the now unencrypted header meets the
protection criteria of the proxy server, the packet will be
sent on to the intended host system.  This method
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combines the advantages of encryption and the proxy
server.
One disadvantage of encryption is more political than
technical.  Some countries do no allow encrypted data to
be transmitted or received within their borders.  The
United States has also placed some limits on what
encryption techniques can be used outside the U.S.
borders. Another disadvantage of encryption is the added
cost, complexity, and data transfer delays.  Adding
encryption adds to the complexity of the required
architecture and the network processes and then there is
the added time delay as data is encrypted and later
deciphered.  While this disadvantage is certainly worth
considering, many corporations consider it a cost of doing
business in a secure manner.
Firewall management and architecture
Once a company has recognized that the threat exists,
it must try to determine just what is the threat, how much
vulnerability is acceptable, and what is needed to stop the
threat.  Knowing the network infrastructure is of
paramount importance. The world's greatest firewall will
not protect the corporate WAN from a modem in a
workstation that is logged on to the corporate network and
is running communications software. Nor can it protect
the corporate WAN from people using their names for
passwords.  Threats such as these must be approached
from a corporate network security viewpoint rather than
relying only on firewalls.
  Assuming that the internal environment has been
secured, what is the threat from the external environment?
 If legitimate users can access critical corporation
information from outside the internal network, so can the
foe.  The company must determine what damage can be
inflicted by intrusion.  Is the potential risk acceptable?  Is
it more appropriate to allow some intrusion than to burden
the legitimate users?  What would be the effect on
company operations, should data files be corrupted or
rouge programs be inserted into company computers? 
These questions must be answered prior to developing a
firewall strategy.  For example, if the company wants
outsiders to access a corporate database to allow them to
interface more efficiently with the company, it may be
wise to provide a replicated database on a standalone
system for such access.
On the other hand, if highly sensitive data with
competitive advantage implications is routinely sent over
unsecured networks, it may be wise to install firewalls and
encryption.  It should by obvious that the corporation must
understand the possible effects of a breach in security and
attempt to eliminate or minimize the threat.
Once firewalls are in place, it is important to monitor
their activity.  Firewall monitoring can provide a
significant amount of information about your system
security.  For example, it can identify the number of times
a threat was detected and countered.  Monitoring may also
provide clues of unsuccessful detection by monitoring
actual access to your internal system.  Additionally, it is
important to monitor firewall performance to determine
the system performance degradation attributable to the
firewall.  Severe degradation must be address through
upgrades in hardware and/or software.  If security
breaches are detected, a recovery process must be in-place
to systematically determine the damage and provide
recovery operations.
Once a firewall is operational, it is important to remain
knowledgeable about firewall advances and emerging
threats.  Firewall technology will continue to advance
providing the capability for increased protection. 
Changes in system architecture or data requirements may
also require a change to the company's firewall strategy.
Recent firewall advances and the future
The advance of Java programmed applets and Active
X-controls have made protecting internal systems tied to
the Internet more difficult.  One recent advance is a
firewall that resides on a desktop or notebook and helps
protect users against faulty and malicious Java applets and
Active X-controls, Trojan horses (programs that perform
an illicit activity as they run), and rogue E-mails.  While
this is not a firewall in the traditional sense because it
does not reside as an intermediate system between the
open systems and the internal system, it does provide
additional security from unwanted intrusion. 
Another advance is in the area of integrated firewalls. 
Routers that combine standards-based encryption,
authentication, tunneling and firewall security into a single
device optimized for Extranet should are forthcoming. 
The principal advantage is the guaranteed compatibility
between security processes and the provision for greater
security with less architectural complexity.
Future products should incorporate more industry
standards.  This is important because today, many
encryption packages are vendor specific and unable to
communicate with products from other vendors.  Better
agreement on industry standards should allow greater
growth in the security protection arena just as it allowed
greater growth in the personal computer market.
Summary
The firewall is normally an intermediate system
between the secure internal networks and the less secure
external networks.  It is intended to keep corporate
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systems safe from intruders, hackers, and accidental entry
into the corporate system. The primary types of firewalls
are screening routers, proxy servers, and stateful
inspectors.   Screening routers apply a set of rules to the
incoming packets of information to determine if they
should be forwarded.  Proxy servers force external
messages to be addressed to the proxy and only after
authentication and authorization will the server pass
packets on to the intended host.
Stateful inspectors look at the packets to verify the
application, user, and transportation method.   Only after
the inspection has determined the packet is authentic and
appropriate, the packet is sent to the intended host.
Encryption is another form of firewall protection which is
being incorporated along with other firewall methods.  
Encryption provides the greatest degree of protection for
the information itself as well as preventing access to those
not possessing the appropriate encryption key.  Globally,
the use of encryption is often limited by political
measures, however, it is gaining acceptance.
Before choosing a firewall architecture, a company
must have the right mind set about the threat.The future
will see more integration of firewall technologies and the
increased use of standards in the industry. It must also
determine what are the possible consequences of a breach
in security and then develop a system to counter the threat.
Additionally, new firewall technologies will address the
potential dangers associated with the use of Java applets
and Active X-controls on the Internet.
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